ABSTRACT
Changing EU rules: the logics of intergovernmental bargains The EU’s procedures and rules are the preserve of its member states, with revisions of the treaties undertaken by government representatives in intergovernmental conferences (IGCs).1 Although both the European Commission and the Parliament do influence the IGC agenda the member states dominate the process,2 ensuring in turn that national preferences prevail over the putative ‘common interest’.3 Although the Commission aspires to be the principal interlocutor on treaty reform (Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) permits the Commission to make proposals to any IGC) steering usually falls to the Council presidency, with the Commission’s role ‘reduced to a simple spectator’.4 The Luxembourg presidency (1985) did allow the Commission an informal role in setting the agenda in the IGC that negotiated the Single European Act, and it likewise participated in the 1990-1 IGC that established Economic and Monetary Union. Jacques Delors presided over the committee that set the agenda, and in effect brokered the political deal that was eventually endorsed by the member states.5 This was exceptional, however, and by no means the norm.
