ABSTRACT
The cases analyzed in this work suggest that electoral democracies cannot consolidate unless they create judicial institutions, mechanisms and remedies for a complete rule of law constructed by democratic means. The reluctance of political elites to embrace the liberal and republican traditions of the liberal democratic model explains part of the overlook on the issue and the scarcity of serious measures to foster the even enforcement of the rule of law. In the case of Latin America, once the electoral democracy has been achieved, critical aspects for exploring the real power that the judicial branch can exert are the following: a) independence of the judiciary, b) judiciary’s capacity to check the executive and other actors of the political scene, c) capacity of the court system to protect civil and political rights, and d) whether or not aggravating practices-such as court corruption, inefficiencies, access to courts, circumvention of laws, defective prison systems and violence against judges and prosecutors-can curtail the judicial power overall capacity to be impartial guardian of the constitutionality. In a graphic way, the relative empowerment of the three branches of government in Latin America v. the liberal democratic model looks as depicted in Figure 9.1.
