ABSTRACT
If we gather together the various strands identified thus far, we arrive at something like the following:
Deterrence rests on the actual decision processes of offenders and potential offenders, regardless of whether those are what other persons would regard as “rational.”
Deterrence rests on the information available to and beliefs of offenders, not on the actual objective environment.
Any sanction—formal or informal, internal or external—that attaches to behavior can serve to deter that behavior. There is good reason to believe that informal sanctions often matter more than formal ones. To the extent that offenders are influenced by personal and social capital, and internal and external norms, these dimensions—not only the imposition of formal penalties—can properly be considered part of the deterrence calculus and open to deliberate intervention.
The severity of any sanction is entirely in the eye of its potential recipient. There is good reason to believe that the scale of severity as viewed by many offenders does not match the scale assumed by authorities and the public. There is good reason to believe that these judgments are different for different offenders.
Offender knowledge about the risks that attach to various behaviors is crucial to deterrence. There is good reason to believe that such knowledge is deeply imperfect.
The communication of sanction risk is crucial to deterrence. Such communication is very rarely pursued in a deliberate manner. Where deliberate communication is pursued, much of it is patently false.
The behavior of authorities frequently sends misleading signals about the deterrence regime offenders actually face.
The standing of rules and official actions in the eyes of offenders greatly affects the impact of sanctions and other acts by authorities. Where rules and actions are viewed as fair and reasonable, their impact is enhanced. Where it is not, their impact is vitiated and even perverse.
The risks many offenders face for their behavior, even for very serious offending, can be strikingly low, even when that offending is well-known to authorities. Those risks can be very uneven and difficult to predict from offender to offender and for the same offender at different times.
The imposition of sanctions does not necessarily result in even a small deterrent effect. Enforcement strategies can undercut deterrence through damage to personal capital, damage to social capital, the erosion and even inversion of stigma, precipitating offending, undercutting self-control and provoking backlash, and undercutting the legitimacy of authorities.
The failure of enforcement strategies can create criminogenic dynamics which are often, but should not necessarily be, read as reflective of deep social and characterological factors.
It is possible to consider the deterrence not only of individuals but also groups, networks, and other collectivities.
It is possible to consider deterrence not only as a factor governing the decisions of individuals and groups, but also as a strategic intervention in group processes and dynamics.
