ABSTRACT
From previous chapters it is obvious that the mental representation of reality is a key problem in psychology. This question was raised by Descartes when he divided the world into physical things and the cognitive subject. The basic thesis of dualism sets the subjectivity of the mind in opposition with the mechanical, physical nature of the body, and excludes any causal interaction between the two in a physical sense. The dualist view and the attempts to overcome it have had a constant influence on the history of science and the history of psychology too (Bolton 2003). The review presented in Table 5.1 sorts theories of knowledge and experience in terms of assumptions about representation and its nature, and about the relationship between the individual and reality or subject-object. The table clearly shows that essentially six theoretical positions can be distinguished. Radical representatives of cognitive neuroscience (Churchland 1995; Pinker 1997; Stich 1983) question not only the social standpoint but also psychology itself, viewing it as a sort of ‘folk’ science operating with somewhat obscure notions.
