ABSTRACT
When considering the position of narrative psychology represented in our book from the point of view of the history of science, we need to say something about the relationship of narrative psychology and postmodernism. The concept of narrative has been so closely connected to postmodern thinking and fictionality that any psychologist with a scientific attitude and at least with some self-respect is inclined to relegate narrative psychology to the world of postmodern fiction and view it with some doubt. Of course, this aversion is not novel. Plato himself (The Republic, Book 7) did not have a high opinion of stories either. He believed that similarly to other forms of the arts, stories were merely imitations of the material world, and the material world was a copy of a higher-order reality. Thus, stories are imitations of imitations. Just like the prisoner of Plato’s cave, who was chained and forced to view the shadow of people on the wall of the cave as they marched by, the listeners of stories are compelled to see the shadow of reality. In Chapter 2 we argued against Platonic thinking by referring to narrative philosophies. More recent aversion to fictionality, fed by a general rejection of the postmodern, can be challenged by taking a closer look at the modes of psychological cognition. The meaning of the term narrative includes elements like putting actions into a cause-effect order, the creation of figures and metaphors, inferences drawn from problem-solving that takes place silently in the actor, etc. Thus, there are several fictitious activities associated with the creation of the meaning of everyday objects and events. From Jeremy Bentham to Jerome Bruner several authors claim that fictions are part of the psychological reality in which we live our life.
