ABSTRACT
One of the obvious components missing from the three accounts of self-knowledge that have been explored so far is the social and interpersonal dimension of reflective self-inquiry and reflective selfevaluation. Hampshire, Sartre, and Rorty tend to regard the acquisition of self-knowledge as an individual activity: that is, as a struggle of the self with itself, with the goal of casting light either on the causes that make the self what it is, or on the self’s relation to being, or on the self’s textual nature. In none of the three accounts is the acquisition of self-knowledge viewed as a process involving the self in social activity, such as seeking the advice and feedback of friends, gathering together the character reports of others, cocreating a narrative, or engaging in some form of shared exploratory dialogue. The acquisition of self-knowledge is seen primarily as an activity of the self, by the self, and for the self. It has more in common with a monologue of the self with itself than it has with a dialogue of the self with the other.
