ABSTRACT

In the last two chapters, we have seen how the analytical projects of Frege

and the early Wittgenstein already demonstrated some of the revolutionary

implications of a determinative theoretical recourse to the structure of language in relation to its everyday practice. Although this recourse did

not figure explicitly in Frege’s project of logical clarification, it was never-

theless, as we have seen, already strongly suggested by his application of the

context principle to criticize psychologism. In Wittgenstein’s explicit for-

mulation of a use-theory of meaningfulness in the Tractatus, this critical

application became the basis of a methodologically radical reflection on the

significance of the structure of signs in the ordinary and everyday contexts

of their use. Both projects, indeed, insofar as they raised the question of the relationship of signs to their ordinary, intersubjective use, also suggested, at

least implicitly, the pervasive and determinative instabilities of a structural-

ist picture of language in relation to the life of practice it aims to capture.

Although it would take a long time yet for these implications to come

clearly to light, the projects that immediately followed in the course of the

developing tradition of analysis would nevertheless confirm them even as

they redefined and broadened the practice of logical or conceptual ‘‘analy-

sis’’ itself. The first, and most methodologically significant, application of Wittgen-

stein’s program of logical syntax was, as we have seen, the Vienna Circle’s

project of analysis. Carnap, Schlick, and other logical empiricists applied

the methods of structural analysis to produce a wide-ranging critical and

reformative project, conceived by at least some of its adherents as having

radical and utopian social consequences as well.2 Especially in its pejorative

application against ‘‘metaphysics,’’ the project involved, as recent scholar-

ship has demonstrated, significant and central misunderstandings of Wittgenstein’s original project.3 Nevertheless it demonstrated the relevance of

the specific methods of logical analysis to broader questions of philosophy of

science, politics, and culture, and consolidated the legacy of these methods

for the logically based styles of philosophical analysis and reflection that

became more and more popular, especially in the USA and Britain, follow-

ing World War II.