ABSTRACT
The transfer of concepts or techniques derived from the history of one area to the prospective future of another is necessarily a dangerous and delicate task. In this case it might seem an academic or even a mischievous one if the indigenous diplomatic traditions of Asia already provided workable answers to the security problems of that area. But though an attempt to make them do so may be read into the doctrine of non-alignment, the effort cannot claim much success. In the twelve years since the most ambitious enunciation of the doctrine, at Bandung in 1955, the ‘area of peace’ that non-alignment was supposed to provide in Asia has in fact been the scene of more military activity than any other part of the world, whereas the area organized on classic balance-of-power principles into two tight military coalitions, Europe, has witnessed only one minor military encounter lasting a few days, Hungary in 1956.1 On the evidence of these years, one might say that the amoral traditions of the balance of power have done better (at least in respect of peace) for those who have lived by them than the moral aspirations of non-alignment.
