ABSTRACT
A few Iraqis used some ropes to try to bring down the statue of the nowdeposed ruler Saddam Hussein, located in the center of Baghdad. The monument held firm. Some observant US soldiers offered a hand. Soon pulleys and machinery were in place and the statue fell over. It was a moment of exhilaration, Iraqis and Americans working together to erase a symbol of tyranny that had victimized both countries and they did so in view of the world since the event was broadcast live. More importantly, it appeared a vindication of the new American policy of preemption, a result all the more poignant given the lingering memory of the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. This jubilation would be shortlived, however. The Americans soon discovered that Hussein’s supposed contacts with al Qaeda were fiction and his stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction non-existent. The ties to 9/11 did not exist. Such discoveries undercut the reasoning behind preemption. The remaining American justification for invading Iraq-to spread democracy in the Middle Eastalso fell short of sustaining the rationale of a preemptive strike. Even those Iraqis who rejoiced at the end of Hussein’s rule of Iraq and welcomed democracy could not but notice the bitter in the sweet: a western power had toppled the regime in a matter of weeks. This success was as humiliating to Arab identity as it was a tribute to American military power. It seemed
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new Iraq. Nor were things to get better.
