ABSTRACT
This chapter applies the previous theoretical analysis of business power in the context of qualitative data from case studies of business lobbying on environmental and financial services regulation in Britain and Germany. Empirical studies of signalling gameshave to confront the problem that the informationknownprivately by some players is also inaccessible to the researcher. In this situation, micro-level case studies can serve as useful quasi-experiments in which the central deductive claims of the model are put to a test (Morton 1999: 133-5). For this purpose, rich empirical information on the respective policy and lobbying processes was collected from newspaper and other media reports, official documents including parliamentary minutes, press releases and expert reports by political, financial and technical consultants. Evidence from six lengthy communications with policymakers, parliamentarians, lobbyists and industry experts serves to provide further insights into the historical episodes. Details of the interviews and email communications are reported in Appendix A.
