ABSTRACT

From the end of World War II, American strategic thought was increasingly influenced by an emerging science of strategy pioneered by civilians. In its assumptions about the relationship between war and politics, this new scientific discourse on war represented the cultural antithesis of the absolutist philosophy that continued to shape the strategic thinking of the military. Whereas the latter tended to regard war as the failure of politics and were sceptical of the political utility of military force, the scientific civilian strategists enthusiastically accepted the primacy of political objectives and sought to restore, through scientific and technological means, the link between force and the rational pursuit of policy that appeared severed in the nuclear age. The evolution of US military discourse thus took on a pronounced dialectical character: the emergence of diametrically opposed conceptions of the political utility of war corresponded closely to the divide between military and civilian professionals within American military culture. The civilian strategists’ intrusion into a realm traditionally regarded as the province of military professionals was legitimized by their scientific credentials and their focus on calibrating the use or threat of force to the ends of national policy. The military, conversely, regarded the civilians’ emphasis on limiting and controlling force with deep suspicion, and were far more concerned with avoiding involvement in unpopular limited wars for ambiguous political objectives that might lack popular support.