ABSTRACT
The case of the Islamic Republic of Iran revives the classical question of
the national interest of the state. It also relates to the issue of nuclear
proliferation. With regard to the first question it is asked: how does
jihadist terrorism Shi’ite style, as combined with Iran’s foreign policy,
reflect a national interest? Is this variety of state-sponsored jihadist
internationalism, run by non-state actors acting as irregular warriors,
incorporated into the national interest of the Iranian state? Well, the Shi’ite
variety of Islamist internationalism is based on a state policy.1 Since its ‘‘Islamic revolution’’ of 1979 Iran has viewed itself – like Russia after the
October Revolution of 1917 – as a stronghold of a transnational revolu-
tionary movement. On these grounds, it can be safely argued, also in a
comparative manner, that Khomeini was a kind of Islamist revolutionary
Lenin. Whether this tradition ended after his death, as some contended, is
to be seen in the present analysis of a post-Khomeinism. Did this era of
revolutionary Islamist internationalism end? I argue that this assumption is
wrong. On the surface there were three different Islamic republics between 1979 and the end of the presidency of M. Khatami. In reality all three have
been rooted in the same political system of revolutionary Mullahcracy and
shared the same ideology of Islamist internationalism Shi’ite-style. All three
were equally committed to the bid of the revolution for the export of its
model. One of the most prominent experts on Iran, the exile Shahram
Chubin, states the issue succinctly in a way that deserves being quoted at
length:
Since 1984 Iran has been labeled a state sponsor of terrorism, and in
recent yeas it has been promoted to being the most active state sponsor
of terrorism . . . Iran’s support of terrorism is in fact a mixed record. Although it is no longer used routinely as an instrument of state policy,
Iran has by no means dispensed with terrorism completely . . . Iran still actively supports Hezbullah and . . . the crossover to Sunni Hamas and Islamic jihad . . . Characteristically, the regime in Teheran seeks to have it both ways: to show that terrorism is a thing of the past, while keeping its options open.2
