ABSTRACT
In the early 1970s, Nozick wrote, ‘[u]nfortunately, too few models of the
structure of moral views have been specified heretofore, though there are
surely other interesting structures’.1 Although there has been progress since
then his sentiment still seems right. My aim in this book has been to show
the merits of one kind of structure, as embodied in a pluralist view of pat-
tern-based reasons that is unconstrained by the Willingness Requirement. In
particular, I have been suggesting that teleological theories of this sort have
appealing features. Views of this kind are similar to versions of Rule Teleology that include a
disaster prevention rule, and to some other variant forms of teleology. If
one argues for views in this vicinity, though, one often seems to face an
uphill struggle. One must try to overcome a peculiar consensus between Act
Teleologists on one hand and anti-teleologists on the other. Act Teleologists
naturally think that we should accept teleology; but they also tend to
believe that once we do, it is just obvious that we should adopt the act-
based structure and handle any difficult cases by modifying our account of value. Anti-teleologists think that we should reject teleology altogether, and
they tend to add that nothing short of that will be sufficiently distant in its
implications from Act Teleology. These otherwise opposed positions share
the assumption that the only serious structural issue is whether to accept or
reject teleology.
