ABSTRACT
Among the most prominent and least understood of campaigns in which the Chinese state is engaged is its war against terrorism. With pervasive jailing and summary executions, China’s “Strike Hard/Maximum Pressure” operation dates to the early-1990s, but it is not the first time Chinese Communists forcefully asserted control over Xinjiang, China’s massive northwestern “new frontier” which is the campaign’s primary theater. With broad brush-strokes the state, its institutions, and agents have tackled political unrest and violence, drug trafficking, and non-violent spiritual and religious movements under the same banner. China asserts that 1,000 ethnic Uyghurs from Xinjiang trained in Afghanistan’s camps, some of which returned home to begin a new jihad, a new fight against the Chinese government. The self-described problem of “splittism,” ethnic violence, and terrorism, ranks first among Beijing’s security concerns, yet how effectively has China addressed this problem? What can the China case add to the current debate about the sources of terrorism and how to effectively counter this threat?
