ABSTRACT
Imperial Japan’s initiation of the Pacific War in 1941 poses tough challenges to my strategic theory. In light of overwhelming material advantages held by the United States, Japan’s decision for war seems to defy any rationality-based explanation. Also, most studies have applied the maneuver-attrition framework to analyzing predominantly continental wars; therefore, its usefulness in analysis of naval warfare is moot, and necessary conceptualization largely non-existent. In this chapter, I interrogate whether strategic theory can meet these challenges and account for the outbreak of the asymmetrical maritime conflict between the United States and Japan. In so doing, I intend to show that the maneuver/attrition distinction is equally valid in conceptualizing maritime strategy and extend the scope of my theory to this realm of warfare. To achieve this aim, I investigate how Japan’s maneuver strategy shaped its motive for preventive war, its military and diplomatic opportunities, and led to the war against the United States in the end. This chapter also evaluates empirical support for the alternative theories.
