ABSTRACT
In the preceding three chapters, I investigated major cases of power shifts to find the best explanation of why power shifts lead to war in some cases but not in others. This chapter presents a final assessment of empirical support the case studies provide for each competing theory as well as hypotheses on sources of military strategy. The results are clear that strategic theory outperforms its competitors by significant margins and that the qualities of military leadership largely determine the types of strategy. I then survey the case universe of 14 power shifts to demonstrate that my argument has broad applicability to a diverse set of cases. I then discuss the theoretical implications of my findings, explaining why international and domestic political institutions can hold only limited effects on the political outcomes of power shifts. In an attempt to draw practical implications, I also address important issues concerning the rise of China and its impact on US-China relations. Contrary to numerous observers, I argue that the resurgent China will pursue a cautious, peaceful foreign policy for years to come. Therefore, the chance of war will depend crucially on the policies of the United States, which will act with increasing aggressiveness as China continues to rise in power. I finally apply strategic theory to illuminating US policies toward the three nuclear aspirants: North Korea, Iran, and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. The central argument here is that the Bush administration possessed a maneuver strategy against Iraq and therefore fought a preventive war; however, it only had attrition strategies against North Korea and Iran and therefore abstained from use of force.
