The Case of Sidney Hook
DOI link for The Case of Sidney Hook
The Case of Sidney Hook book
In the foregoing chapters, I have tried to make a philosophical case for a
pragmatist conception of democracy that draws from a decidedly Peircean
foundation. The case has proceeded along two tracks simultaneously. The
ﬁrst has been to show that a new pragmatist conception of democracy is
necessary because the dominant approach to pragmatist political theory –
Deweyan democracy – is irremediably ﬂawed. The second has been to show
that the Peircean conception of democracy is a viable democratic theory in
its own right, that is, irrespective of its pragmatist credentials. I take it that the primary dimensions of the philosophical case for Peircean democracy
are at this point clear. The discussion thus far has been highly theoretical,
perhaps even abstract at times. Pragmatists of any description will be inter-
ested to know the Peircean view’s ‘‘cash value,’’ what it means for practice.
This is the subject of the current chapter.