ABSTRACT
A Vindication of the Rights of Woman is Mary Wollstonecraft’s most well known political treatise. Yet, much of this work is concerned with the ostensibly private relationships of men and women, in particular the relationship of husband and wife. It is often and rightly seen as Wollstonecraft’s refutation of Rousseau’s ideal woman, Sophie. However, we should not overlook Wollstonecraft’s claim that she “warmly . . . admire[s] the genius of that able writer” (VRW, 24). Wollstonecraft, as we have seen in the first chapter, has learned much from the Solitary Walker. Rousseau teaches us, “We are so to speak, born twice: once to exist and once to live; once for our species and once for our sex” (Emile, 211). In other words, human beings are comprised of two parts, that part which is human and that part which is male or female. Rousseau tells his readers that this is true of females as well as males. “Everything is equal: girls are children, boys are children; the same name suffices for beings so much alike” (Emile, 211). The education that Rousseau designs for Emile is meant to preserve the natural wholeness of man, the proper combination of the two parts of human beings. Even as Rousseau writes his educational treatise, he anticipates that his critics will dismiss his fanciful vision: “For a long while they have seen me in the land of chimeras” (Emile, 253). Sharing Rousseau’s appreciation of the importance of the female sex to the woman, the family, and the political community, Wollstonecraft follows Rousseau into the land of chimeras pursuing a utopian dream. She expects to find women, who are considered “human creatures” as well as females. Yet, Wollstonecraft knows that chimera has a second meaning. A chimera is a mythological creature comprised of parts of various animals. Wollstonecraft uses both meanings of the word chimera, suggesting the precarious nature of her utopian dream. Women, who are not comprised of both the human and the female, are chimeras in a mythological sense. They are monstrous because they are comprised of only parts of woman and do not fully reflect
human nature. But, it is not Rousseau or even John Locke, two Enlightenment thinkers well known for their egalitarian political philosophies, who treat woman as human creatures, as well as females. As we have seen in previous chapters, both Rousseau and Locke educate only part of woman, albeit different fractions. Rousseau’s and Locke’s “half-beings” result from the state of nature theorists’ inability to account for the biological and the physical differences between man and woman in a manner that preserves that which is common to all human beings and that which is particular to the female sex. Yet, Rousseau has offered another alternative to himself. The inquiry into the nature of human beings, Rousseau tells his readers, is not “unworthy of the Aristotles . . . of our century” (Discourses, 124). Indeed, Mary Wollstonecraft’s political philosophy resonates with Aristotle’s. For both thinkers the soul is central to their understanding of the human condition. Aristotle puts the human soul together with the female body in a way that is compatible, forming a whole, unfractured woman. Woman may fulfill her nature as a human being by practicing virtue. Yet, her affection and attachment to others, which are so often associated with her capacity to bear children, are not a detriment to her capacity for reason and virtue. Indeed, as we have already seen in the previous chapter and will see again in this chapter, reason and affection compliment one another. This is demonstrated in Aristotle’s account of the friendship between husband and wife. It is a model, which Wollstonecraft does not find on the pages of Rousseau’s or Locke’s treatises, but resonates with her own aspirations for marriage. Aristotle points the way through the land of chimeras to the fulfillment of Wollstonecraft’s utopian dream.
