ABSTRACT
At first glance, the influence of John Locke on Mary Wollstonecraft seems rather clear. It is especially clear when considering Wollstonecraft’s early career. The title of her first published work, Thoughts on the Education of Our Daughters, implies Wollstonecraft’s intention to imitate Locke. Wollstonecraft’s intention is made explicit in the first pages of her educational treatise. She writes, “To be able to follow Mr. Locke’s system (and this may be said of almost all treatises on education) the parents must have subdued their own passions.”1 Locke’s influence seems to persist in Wollstonecraft’s most well known political treatise, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman. As we have seen in the previous chapter, in prescribing an education that would foster independence and virtue in women, Wollstonecraft does follow Locke’s teaching in some important respects. For example, like Locke, she encourages young girls to play outside in order to form healthier, robust bodies. Both authors consider a strong body important to the subsequent formation of a strong mind. However, upon closer examination of both Locke’s and Wollstonecraft’s treatment of human reason, it becomes clear that Wollstonecraft understands human reason very differently from Locke. In this chapter, I will consider Locke’s conception of the human mind: the limits of human reason and the end of human reason. I will then turn my attention to Wollstonecraft’s conception of the human soul and her understanding of reason. In contrast to Locke, Wollstonecraft argues there are innate principles of truth. Not only does she encourage her readers to contemplate God, but she argues that human beings can attain divine wisdom. Furthermore, Wollstonecraft departs from her predecessor by suggesting that the end of reason is not simply liberty in civil society, but the perfection of our nature. Finally, I will consider the implications their different conceptions of human reason have for the relationship between husband and wife. Not only does Wollstonecraft want to see reason and virtue restored to women, but she
would like to see the relationship between man and woman improved. In the end, Locke disappoints our hopes that he is able to be Wollstonecraft’s guide through the land of chimeras. We are disappointed, not so much by Locke’s understanding of the female half of woman, but by his understanding of the human half of both man and woman. To be sure, Locke offers to Wollstonecraft an example of a woman who is, to a certain degree, rational and virtuous and, in some important respects, enjoys equality with man. However, Locke’s human being, male or female, is a fraction of the creature Wollstonecraft sees as human. Neither male nor female exhibit the great potential for human reason, nor do they exhibit affection for their “fellow creatures.” Like Rousseau, Locke presents to Wollstonecraft a woman, who is “wild chimera,” a “half-being.”
