ABSTRACT
Between 1997 and 2000 a dramatic transformation took place in the rules and institutions governing economic activity within Korea. Almost half of the 11,000 regulations in place prior to the crisis were abolished and the majority of the remaining regulations reformed. Additionally, over 1,840 informal regulations were identified and either abolished or, in a small minority of cases, formalised (OECD, 2000b: 49). At the same time as large parts of the old regulatory frameworks were being relegated to the dustbin of history, new prudential standards, designed to enhance the functioning of market pressures, were being created. In parallel with these processes of policy reform, an equally important set of changes has taken place at the level of institutional structures. The most visible, and important, aspects of this process of institutional reconfiguration have involved the creation of a new independent financial regulatory authority and a more autonomous central bank. Such reforms serve to place significant aspects of economic policy beyond direct political control and to reassure global capital that economic policy will be determined by clear technical criteria, not fickle politicians. At the heart of this institutional reconfiguration is a desire to ensure that political pressures and interests are not allowed to distort the functioning of markets (Jayasuriya, 2001a).
