ABSTRACT
By 1981, the international situation had changed markedly. Whereas most of the 1970s had witnessed De´tente between the United States and the Soviet Union, by the beginning of the 1980s, the two superpowers found themselves in a state of renewed confrontation or what has been termed the ‘‘Second Cold War.’’ Among the concerns at this time, as it had been increasingly during the late 1970s, was that of the US-Soviet military balance, particularly in terms of strategic nuclear forces. Although the concerns were similar, the dynamic, at least at the offi-
cial level, had changed. Whereas Presidents Ford and Carter had attempted to confront the military situation within the overall bounds of De´tente, President Reagan, at least rhetorically, rejected the framework of this policy as it had evolved in the 1970s. Reagan viewed De´tente as having dangerously eroded American military strength while allowing the Soviet Union to match or even in some cases exceed the United States in many areas of comparison. This required a considerable expansion of US military capabilities, to restore a favorable balance of power and thus a less confrontational relationship with Moscow.1
Reagan’s views had become more prominent during the late 1970s, as a number of organizations emerged warning Americans of their country’s military imbalance vis a` vis the USSR. Most prominent of these (and of which Ronald Reagan was a member) was the Committee on the Present Danger. When Reagan took office in 1981, its members were appointed to Executive positions in considerable numbers. Among those better known were Richard Pipes (Director of Soviet Affairs for the National Security Council), Richard Perle (Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy), and Paul Nitze (Chief Negotiator to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Talks and, later, Special Representative for Arms Control and Disarmament Negotiations).2
