ABSTRACT
In the area of strategic defense against nuclear attack-manifested both in active forces of interceptors and anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) and in passive measures such as civil defense-US efforts waxed and waned during the 1950s and 1960s. A major air and civil defense program was instituted, as were efforts to develop an ABM system. However, by the late 1960s, these went into decline. The growth in Soviet ICBM and SLBM launchers meant that any ABM system would be in danger of being overwhelmed by sheer numbers of warheads. Furthermore, any attempt by either the United States or the Soviet Union to match increasing warhead levels-made all the more difficult by MIRVing efforts-would lead to an arms race that could easily escape their control. Accordingly, both nations agreed to a significant curtailment of their ABM efforts in 1972. On the American side, the lack of a large, effective Soviet strategic bomber force led to a rundown of US air defense forces, whereas the enormous numbers of rapidly deliverable Soviet strategic warheads meant that efforts to protect the US population in the event of nuclear war were generally seen as futile, meriting little attention. As concerns about the Soviet military buildup emerged in the mid-
1970s, strategic defense became an issue in the United States. The Soviets, unlike the Americans, placed a high priority on strategic defense. As the US Strategic Air Command possessed a far more formidable bomber force than the USSR, a commitment to a large air defense system made sense. As for civil defense, the Soviet Union’s very significant efforts in this area indicated, to many American defense analysts, a dangerous effort aimed at supporting a strategy of victory in a nuclear war.
