ABSTRACT
As with most categories of the US-Soviet military balance during the 1970s, comparisons of American and Soviet naval strength reflected two trends common in assessments of the time: first, the decline in overall numbers and funding resulting from the war in Vietnam and its aftermath, which affected all branches of the US armed forces; second, the concurrent increase in investment by the Soviet Union in its military during this same period. The results of these developments would shape the debate on the balance of naval power during the 1970s and play a considerable role in shaping policy during the 1980s, when the Reagan Administration would undertake a massive expansion of naval strength. Although all branches of the US military had suffered reductions in
force during the 1970s, the US Navy was particularly hard hit. Schlesinger noted in his FY 1975 report to Congress that although the US Navy had some 951 ‘‘commissioned general purpose ships’’ (aircraft carriers, major surface combatants, submarines, amphibious ships, and replenishment vessels) in service in FY 1968, this number had fallen to just 588 by FY 1973 and would fall again to 522 by FY 1975.1 Indeed, numbers fell even further, down to 476 ships in 1976 and then to 462 in 1978.2 This did not, however, reflect a particular desire to erode American naval strength for its own sake. Most of the ships decommissioned during this time were built during World War II, particularly destroyers, submarines, and minesweepers.3 These vessels had reached block obsolescence by the 1970s, having in some cases served in three major wars (World War II, Korea and Vietnam), as well as in an exacting peacetime environment. Moreover, they were unable to carry the increasingly sophisticated electronics, weaponry, and, in the case of the war-built carriers, aircraft that entered service with the US Navy during this time. What was problematic was that as vast numbers of older ships were
retired, there was not an across-the-board effort to match these reductions with considerable numbers of new vessels. Eleven years elapsed (1964-75) during which no new destroyers were added to the US fleet,4
while only two nuclear-powered cruisers joined the fleet between 1967
and 1976.5 The nuclear-powered carrier Nimitz took a full seven years to build and commission.6 There were some major efforts during this time, especially with frigates and attack submarines,7 but on the whole, American naval efforts were inconsistent and did not reflect commitment to an overall strategic plan. The Soviet Navy, by contrast, was undergoing steady development in
order to become a fleet with global presence, capable of projecting Soviet power in many areas where the USSR had not previously enjoyed a military presence. Under the energetic leadership of Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov, who had assumed this position in 1956, the Soviet Navy had, by the 1970s, shifted its efforts away from countering US carrier task forces and ballistic missile submarines in waters near the Soviet Union to building a fleet capable of challenging American naval forces in areas considered to be of importance to Moscow.8 By 1977, the inventory of the Soviet Navy included 32 cruisers, 87 destroyers, and 107 escort ships (frigates or frigate-type vessels), as well as over 258 general purpose submarines (more than 80 nuclear-powered) and the Kiev, the Soviet Union’s first aircraft carrier.9 The Soviet fleet was receiving more effective warships, with new anti-ship cruise missiles as a major offensive element. Soviet naval aviation, although it could not match the powerful air wings of the US carrier fleet, was receiving more potent land-based bombers, like the Tu-22M Backfire, which posed a greater threat than had their less capable predecessors.10
