Forces for rapid deployment

The emergence of a balance of power projection forces between the United States and the Soviet Union during the 1970s was a relatively recent phenomenon. The United States had, since the end of World War II (when the capability was acquired on a vast scale), been at the forefront here. The Korean and Vietnam wars, together with interventions in Lebanon (1958) and the Dominican Republic (1965), were examples of the American capacity for deploying and sustaining large combat forces in regions far from its own territory. Apart from the deployment of air defense personnel to Egypt in 1970, during that country’s ‘‘War of Attrition’’ with Israel, the USSR was unable to match such deployments. The stationing of nuclear weapons in Cuba during 1962 was reversed by the United States, a dramatic example of Moscow’s inability to successfully engage in such actions during this time. The experience of Vietnam, however, led to disillusionment with

large-scale interventions, without a direct threat to national security. Congressional action, including the War Powers Act of 1973, reflected this mood. Accordingly, the emphasis on power projection forces declined during the 1970s. Instead of utilizing its own forces, the United States would provide military equipment to local allies in order for these countries to play a stabilizing role in regions of importance. The Nixon Doctrine led to such efforts in Southeast Asia and, most importantly, in Iran, where the Shah came to be seen as a pillar of stability in an area of vital importance for Washington. At the same time, the Soviet Union began an expansion of its own

capabilities in this area. Along with its naval buildup, the USSR began to expand its airlift and sealift capabilities, improved the infrastructure of naval facilities in areas like the Indian Ocean, and developed forces for power projection missions. These developments coincided with growing upheaval in the Third

World. A series of successful guerrilla wars and coups in Africa led to the establishment of left-leaning regimes in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and elsewhere. The fall of pro-American governments in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in 1975 reflected this trend. From an American

perspective, the fact that many of these new regimes were (or appeared to be) pro-Soviet marked a shift in the global balance of power toward Moscow. The role of the Soviet Union was also seen to be decisive. The Soviet support for the Vietnamese Communists in 1974-75, the combined role of Soviet arms and Cuban combat troops in Angola in 1975, as well as Soviet support for rebels in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau indicated a Soviet strategy of intervention (albeit through proxy troops and arms supplies) in the Third World. Nor was the Soviet Union’s more assertive role the only concern in

Washington. The embargo of oil supplies to the United States by Arab members of OPEC in 1973-74 drew American attention toward the issue of intervention in the Persian Gulf. The dependence of the United States on such supplies for its own prosperity was brought home sharply by this event. Furthermore, the embargo was carried out by such friendly governments as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, as a result of American support for Israel in the 1973 war. If hostile forces-either internal or external-should seize control of these countries, the possibility of a longer and more comprehensive cutoff of oil supplies was much greater. It was during the winter of 1974-75 that the issue of US military

intervention to secure Persian Gulf oil was first broached. President Ford stated that ‘‘If a country is being strangled . . . that in effect means that a country has a right to protect itself against death.’’1 Schlesinger noted ‘‘it is indeed feasible’’ to use American military power in such an event.2 In a widely read article in January 1975, Robert W. Tucker, a professor of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University, argued that a case existed for the use of force to secure oil supplies in such an eventuality. ‘‘There is a general consensus . . . that if the present situation goes on unaltered, a disaster resembling the 1930s is indeed a distinct possibility and that it would have as its immediate and precipitating cause the present oil price.’’3