ABSTRACT
In the debate over the US-Soviet balance in the 1970s, the issue of military expenditures emerged as one of its most persistent topics. It was also one of the most intangible measurements of relative military strength, for two reasons. First, the scale of Soviet defense expenditure was extraordinarily difficult to ascertain, to say the least. A host of factors-the difficulty of determining the actual value of the ruble with that of the dollar, the USSR’s command economy, (which meant that much of its military effort was enmeshed within a variety of different ministries responsible for various sectors), the endemic secrecy of the Soviet statecontributed to this. Second, the variety of factors determining American defense spending, (including differing criteria listed in open reports, as well as such factors as inflation), meant that a determination of US expenditures, while far easier than ascertaining concurrent Soviet efforts, was still difficult to discern. Moreover, the impact of figures available, which juxtaposed rising
Soviet spending levels and declining American expenditures, had a considerable impact on the overall defense debate. Generally overlooked were such factors as what was being purchased by these increased Soviet sums. Often, the effectiveness of weapons procured was not commensurate to the sums invested. Nor did this focus on defense spending take into account the very different issues faced by the United States and the Soviet Union in making spending decisions. As John Collins cautioned in a study of the military balance published in 1978, ‘‘Comparing defense budgets . . . is among the most publicized, but least meaningful, means of measuring military power.’’1
