ABSTRACT
The period from 1976 to 1985 saw a considerable deterioration in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Two distinct periods can be identified for this timeframe: the decline and fall of De´tente between 1976 and 1980 and the ‘‘Second Cold War’’ of 1980 to 1985. The reasons for this turn of events were numerous. The differing concepts of De´tente held by the United States and the Soviet Union played a considerable role in leading to a deterioration in relations. Soviet actions in Angola, the Horn of Africa, and Afghanistan, appeared, in American eyes, to violate the spirit of De´tente. Another cause was that the superpower De´tente was a global process, in which numerous interests came into play, many of which exacerbated conflict rather than alleviated it. One aspect that received considerable attention during this time was
that of the military balance between the two powers. During 1976-80, critics of De´tente came to see the military balance as shifting dangerously in favor of the Soviet Union. These critics saw a link between the large-scale Soviet military buildup and the greater willingness on Moscow’s part to use force, both directly and indirectly, in the Third World. They saw this increased military capability as a means for the Soviet Union to achieve global hegemony, at the expense of the United States. These critics did not go unanswered. Analysts and commentators both
within and outside of government challenged the view that the Soviet Union was overtaking the United States in terms of military power. However, the critics, who included such prominent individuals as Paul Nitze, who had more than 25 years experience in official national security positions, were able to convince both elite and public opinion of an increasing Soviet threat. It was this debate, on the perception of the superpower military bal-
ance, that came to be so prominent during this time. The period 198085, which saw a resurgence of US-Soviet confrontation, witnessed the implementation of many of the hawks’ arguments in American foreign and defense policy. The historiography of this period makes considerable mention of the
importance the military balance-or the perception of it-had on the
shaping of events. Generally, the historiography can be divided into two categories: the work of analysts writing during the period and that of historians writing since the end of the Cold War. In the first category are those like Fred Halliday, who devoted a chapter of his book on superpower relations in the 1970s and 1980s to what he termed ‘‘The Decline of US Military Superiority.’’1 Halliday viewed the military aspect as implicitly linked to other developments during the 1970s:
[T]he US military programmes of the Second Cold War period reflect the combination of three interrelated considerations: an attempt to lengthen once again the quantitative gap between US and Soviet capabilities; a desire to take advantage of the opportunities for greater superiority opened up by new technological developments to develop a war-winning capacity; and anxiety at the manner in which the erosion of the US military superiority had led to the emergence of challenges to US policy in the world at large. (My italics)2
Halliday went on to note that ‘‘on its own the arms race would not have precipitated the Second Cold War: that developed only out of the combination of the shift in the military balance with other developments that compounded US alarm at the change in the military sphere.’’3
