ABSTRACT

A serious deterioration in relations between many Western nations and Russia has recently been recorded in the public media and by the respective governments. Grievances have been proclaimed on both sides. Russia regards the Jackson-Vanek Amendment, enacted by the Congress in 1976, as a relic of the Cold War. Legally, it ties U.S. trade benefits to Russia’s emigration policy – a consideration that is no longer relevant. Clearly, the abolition of this legislation is long overdue. Although average tariff rates of the Unites States and the EU are now not high by any standards, certain sectors such as temperate-zone agricultural products, steel and light manufactures – sectors in which Russia is expected to be developing competitive advantages – are classified by the EU as “vulnerable” or “sensitive.” This represents a substantial potential barrier to the expansion of Russia’s exports. Similar obstacles exist in some U.S. import sectors.1 The spring 2004 enlargement of the EU and NATO was supported by Russia on the condition that the EU would delay the imposition of higher import tariffs on “sensitive” Russian goods and remove restrictions on energy imports. Russia also asked the EU to accept higher quotas on Russian grain imports and to ease market access for Russian steel products. Unless such concessions were made, Russian officials argued, their enterprises would suffer from increased tariff barriers in the new EU member states of Central and Eastern Europe; for under present EU-Russian treaties, the latter would be allowed to export to Russia at lower tariff levels, while Russia would face higher tariff levels on some exports to them. The EU has maintained that some tariffs on Russian goods might be higher, but the average level of tariffs would be lower.2