ABSTRACT
During the conquest of Siberia and the subsequent phase of consolidation, consuming most of the seventeenth century, Cossacks constituted the absolute majority of its Russian population. In most towns, albeit with the significant exclusion of Tobol’sk and Eniseisk, they outshone the townspeople even in terms of economic resources. As the social structure of European Russia, mainly nobles and serfs, did not exist beyond the Urals, the role of Cossacks in local politics was paramount. Nevertheless, until recently, historians have neglected the internal organization of Cossacks in Russia as much as in Siberia,1 while both romantic and despicable images have dominated. Since historians of the state-historical school regarded the state as the moving force in the conquest, they deemed Siberian Cossacks mere executors of official orders. Giving prominence to heroic exploits, they saw the whole conquest of Siberia as an ‘achievement of Russian weapons’ and studied the voevodas and other officials, not the Cossacks.2 The Siberian regionalists criticized this interpretation in the nineteenth century; yet, they ascribed the main role in the conquest to the ‘free’ colonization, undertaken by merchants and trappers. Concerning the administration, they agreed with their opponents but conceived of officials generally as exploiters.3 Ogloblin’s innovative study of town rebellions, a spin-off of his chancellery inventory, remained for a long time the exception.4
