ABSTRACT
The participation in international military operations has grown
considerably, both in volume and in its share of the defence budget. International operations, and their demands for mobility, protection, readiness and interoperability, are increasingly determining the development
of the Norwegian armed forces, not least the army. This has to a large extent influenced procurement and training and exercise patterns. Such decisions have often been implemented at short notice, but with considerable con-
sequences for the long term defence plans. Norwegian Defence Policy Commission: final report, 20001
The Norwegian case presents an interesting combination of civilian activism and military foot-dragging. On the civilian side, Norway was a frontrunner, being the first country in the world to develop a civilian standby capacity for peace operations as part of its ‘model’ for peace diplomacy in the early 1990s.2 The Norwegian standby systems have served as a source of inspiration, not just for the other Nordic countries but for many other countries as well. In contrast, the Norwegian efforts to meet the new military requirements for success in post-Cold War peace operations have been slow, reluctant and plagued by financial problems. The reform process only started in earnest after the Kosovo conflict which served as a painful wake up call for the Norwegian armed forces and their political masters. In spite of these problems Norway has managed to meet our eleven requirements for success, but it has had to rely on ad hoc solutions to do so.
