ABSTRACT
Anti-submarine warfare during the interwar period ‘… was initially driven by a general awareness of the potential threat posed by submarines.’1 This generic view had only become more focussed in the late 1930s, as the strength of the nascent German U-boat arm became apparent. Thereafter doctrine had developed rapidly to counter the immediate and dangerous threat as the U-boat campaign escalated through the Second World War. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War the anti-submarine measures necessary to deal with the wartime submersible and schnorkel-fitted U-boats were well understood, but there had been no practical experience against submarines capable of high underwater speed. It was assumed that there would be no resurgence of the submarine threat from Germany (and much had been done to ensure that this was the case). Russia was, therefore, the only possible future enemy. Indeed, many in the British establishment had come to that conclusion several years earlier. By 1943-44 some elements, at least, of the British intelligence organization were convinced that states outside the Axis powers would pose a post-war threat, and Russia was singled out as an especially important case. The intelligence agencies began (and in some cases, continued) covert operations against her.2
