ABSTRACT
Compared to the period that followed, particularly the Seven Years’ War (1756-63), the years 1722-55 have received insufficient attention, in large part because the wars appear less important: they have certainly featured little in the collective myths of subsequent ages. For example, the French army was effective both during the War of the Polish Succession (1733-5) and the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-8, the French taking part from 1741), but there has been relatively little research on this period, especially on the operational dimension. As a consequence, work on Frederick the Great’s Prussia,1
which focuses on the Seven Years’ War, lacks an adequate comparative dimension. Victory over the French at Rossbach in 1757 (see p. 95) is employed to assert a systemic Prussian advantage that is misleading, not least for the 1740s when French forces in the Low Countries were commanded by Marshal Saxe, an outstanding operational commander, as well as an imaginative thinker on the nature of war. Maurice, Count of Saxe’s generalship, was instructive not only because of the battlefield ability he displayed in 1745-7 to control large numbers effectively, in both attack and defence, but also because of his determined espousal of a war of manoeuvre. His preference for bold manoeuvres, emphasis on gaining and holding the initiative, and stress on morale, contrast markedly with stereotypical views of non-Frederician mid-eighteenth century warfare, as indeed do the Russian invasions of Moldavia and Finland in 1739 and 1742 respectively. Work on Prussia could profitably be integrated with that on other forces in order to gain a better grasp of the extent and limitations of Prussia’s comparative advantages, which otherwise tend to be seen in isolation.
