ABSTRACT
Special Forces soldiers went about their quotidian, small-war duties across SouthVietnam: teaching classes, running small arms ranges, holding sick call forMontagnard communities, laying out engineering projects, issuing patrol orders, conducting rehearsals, and patrolling. The discordant discourse in Saigon andWashington did finally disturb the day-to-day activities in CIDG camps. Orders from MACV and other Operation Switchback measures spurred the opening of new camps and accepting of new responsibilities. New camp locations were often in more isolated areas, closer to South Vietnam’s western borders. Montagnard and other minority communities in these areas had not had as much contact with non-Vietnamese outsiders, nor were they as well developed as the Rhade. Less was known about these areas and their residents. Pre-mission planning and preparation – the hallmark of successful special operations – was less detailed and ultimately less effective. MACV mandated new coordination with South Vietnamese district and province chiefs rather than with leaders of the Montagnard and other minority communities. The geographical isolation of these new mobilization efforts created new, local security missions during the critical, initial stages of mobilization and training. These differences affected the execution and ultimate chances for success of these new camps.1
