ABSTRACT
US Army Special Forces gained in the Montagnards the sturdy allies they needed to reduce the vulnerability of the Central Highlands. Defended villages and hamlet complexes extended limited control and legitimacy for the Saigon regime into strategically significant regions of South Vietnam. In the absence of counterinsurgency doctrine’ Special Forces soldiers applied their unconventional warfare background and training to missions assigned and implied. Special Forces soldiers turned the Montagnards into resistance groups in this small war. The US Army’s doctrine had a counterguerrilla focus. This critical realization and execution demonstrated cognitive dominance: a realization of the actual terms of engagement and subsequent organization for mission accomplishment. The operational focus was defensive and political from the initial Special Forces mobilization of the Rhade communities around Buon Enao until MACV reoriented the Civilian Irregular Defense Program, first, towards offensive operations and border surveillance in 1963. Taken together, these elements constituted an operational innovation in counterinsurgency. It would take the trauma of 1968’s Tet offensive and another change of command at MACV to bring about a return to appreciating the strategic importance of secure villages and hamlets in South Vietnam.
