ABSTRACT
If there is one factor which seemingly may be isolated and regarded as the main catalyst for the escalation which led to the Six Day War, it is the guerrilla activities of the Palestinian organizations, and in particular the Fatah, against Israel. This form of warfare, which found expression primarily in acts of sabotage and mine-laying, began in early 1965, and gained momentum until it became – from Israel’s viewpoint – intolerable.1
It confronted the IDF senior command with a serious challenge, and despite endless discussions and indecision among the General Staff, they did not succeed in formulating an effective response which would end the incidents. Israel’s pre-war borders, and in particular the Jordanian border, were easily penetrable and difficult to block. In the absence of a direct way of tackling the problem, Israel cast responsibility on any country through whose borders the terrorists infiltrated. Jordan and Lebanon, from which most of the saboteurs came, tried to prevent the infiltrations, while Syria, which supported the Fatah, was generally careful to ensure that the attacks did not stem directly from its territory, and tried to implicate Jordan.
