ABSTRACT
In philosophical discourse ‘realism’ usually concerns the relation between a subject of experience – that is, a conscious mind – and a class of objects, which may be more or less broad in scope. If one is a realist about a certain object or thing, then one believes that the thing in question exists independently of one’s experiencing it, whether in perception or as an object of thought. Because the range of things about which one could have such a belief is extremely wide, the term ‘realist’ does not, in itself, have a definite meaning.1 Strictly speaking, when one asserts of anyone that he or she is a realist, one ought always to specify what it is that the person is a realist about. Correspondingly, when one ascribes anti-realism to someone, one ought to spell out exactly which class of objects the person is denying subject-independent reality to. In practice, however, the terms ‘realism’ and ‘anti-realism’ often get bandied around in philosophical discussions without their frame of reference being stipulated. In many, perhaps most, cases this is of little importance, since the relevant objects will be determinable from the discursive context. But in certain instances the meaning of the terms remains thoroughly opaque due to a lack of clarity and precision on the part of the discussants.
