ABSTRACT
Historical Title and Boundary Demarcations between the Two Nations . . . . . 73
From Yalta Blueprint to San Francisco System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73 The Kuriles in the Yalta Blueprint – Reward for Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . 73 Potsdam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 General Order No. 1 – Bargaining over Occupation Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 The Instrument of Surrender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 The San Francisco Peace Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Toward the “Unresolved Problem”: Disposition of the Kuriles in the Peace Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Japanese Peace Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 Early US Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
T-Documents, CAC-Documents The Kuriles and the US Trusteeship in Micronesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 Early Drafts of the Peace Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
March 1947 Draft, July 1947 Draft, August 1947 Draft, January 1948 Draft
Reopening of Peace Treaty Preparation and Sebald’s Commentary . . . . . . 85 September and October 1949 Drafts, November 1949 Draft, Sebald’s Commentary, December 1949 Draft
Dulles and Peace Treaty drafts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 August 1950 Draft, “Seven Principles,” March 1951 Draft
British Preparation of Japanese Peace Drafts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 US-UK Joint Drafts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
May 1951 Draft, June 1951 Draft The San Francisco Peace Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
After San Francisco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
The disposition of the Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin in the San Francisco Peace Treaty contains the following two major problems. (1) The Treaty did not specify to which country Japan renounced these territories. (2) It did not define their limits. These points concern the origin of the territorial problem between Japan and Russia, known as the “Northern Territories” problem. On the first point, Japan agreed to renounce the territories specified in the Treaty, but did not specifically renounce them to the USSR. In addition, the USSR did not sign the Treaty, and thus was not a party to it. The second point matters only with regard to the Kuriles, i.e., which islands are included, or not included, in the “Kurile Islands” that Japan renounced in the Treaty.
