Substance

Leibniz is intent on starting at absolute rock-bottom. There can be no hint of convention or arbitrariness at this stage. Everything here must be completely determinate. The items he arrives at in this quest for a foundation are called ‘‘substances.’’ They are self-sufficient and independent of everything else – except God. Thus they are mind-independent objects par excellence, and the building blocks for all else that exists. A proper understanding of substances is crucial for any interpretation of

Leibniz. In this chapter I offer some of Leibniz’s reasons for starting with substances and some of his arguments for the nature of substances. This will launch the larger project designed to come to terms with the mature metaphysics – which by all accounts shines the spotlight on these premium individuals and seeks to explain everything through them. It is helpful to think of substances as functioning in the way ‘‘theoretical

entities’’ function in scientific theories. Such entities as germs and elastic, moving atoms are postulated by the theory as a way of explaining a set of regularities in the world. The existence of such things can’t be directly confirmed, but they are used to rationalize and make more intelligible what is observable. Similarly, substances (except in the case of the one which is oneself) can’t be directly observed but can be used to explain what is known, or what is in the ‘‘evidence base.’’