ABSTRACT
Long before the advent of the Chinese Communists, governing authorities had looked askance at displays of religiosity not condoned as orthodox. The propensity towards religion within the ruling bureaucracy may well have varied in accordance with time and location, but the Chinese literatus was intrinsically a sceptic, brought up to remember that ‘Master Confucius never discussed violence, chaos, strange occurrences and spirits’ (https://s3-euw1-ap-pe-df-pch-content-public-p.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/9780203968659/61c314ee-3e79-4fa2-9412-b74e19edc2bc/content/figu290_B.tif" xmlns:xlink="https://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"/>) and ‘to keep ghosts and spirits at a respectful distance’ (https://s3-euw1-ap-pe-df-pch-content-public-p.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/9780203968659/61c314ee-3e79-4fa2-9412-b74e19edc2bc/content/figu291_B.tif" xmlns:xlink="https://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"/>). 1 This anti-metaphysical bias indubitably influenced official attitudes towards religious movements and in modified form, through the kaleidoscope of the literary tradition, also China’s popular culture. 2 However, as the late imperial buojuan tradition demonstrates, Confucian principles and adherence to religious societies were by no means mutually exclusive. 3 This third part is intended to illustrate the motivation of the officials who took action against Christianity as guardians of ‘orthodoxy’. Conversely, it will shed light on Christianity as a manifestation of late imperial ‘heresy’. Its official perception as part of China’s heterodox traditions is ultimately analysed as proof of Christianity’s successful inculturation, following more than a century of missionary prohibition.
