ABSTRACT
Indonesia has made remarkable progress toward democratization, and there is hope that the new Yudhoyono administration will be able to effectively act against violence, both the indiscriminate violence of JI and the reactive violence of the laskars. At the same time, the challenges posed by Islamists, Muslim militants, and terrorists are considerable. Of further concern are potential crossovers in membership among these groups. If Islamism or violence by Muslim militants or terrorists grows during the 2006-2009 period, then Indonesia will pose an enormous security challenge to the West and to its ASEAN neighbors. Indonesia is the world’s largest Muslim country, as well as the third largest democracy, and lies at the heart of Southeast Asia. This position gives it special geopolitical significance, given the rise of China and consequent changes in the balance of power in Asia. It is also a major front in the war against terrorism, having experienced four major bombing attacks in as many years perpetrated by JI, a transnational organization with previously strong ties to Al Qaeda. Were Indonesia either to move further down the road toward becoming an Islamic state, or to descend into a state of chaos, the ramifications would be far-reaching. Given these high stakes, there are a number of policy implications for interested
parties ranging from the new Yudhoyono administration and secular opposition parties, to the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN), Australia, and the United States. All have a vested interest in the consolidation of Indonesia’s fledgling democracy and rule of law. All have a role to play in helping the Indonesian government develop its internal capabilities vis-à-vis Islamist militants. The problem, though, is that too much foreign interference will play into the strong senses of xenophobia, displayed by both the Islamists and Indonesia’s secular nationalists.
