ABSTRACT
Following the October 1972 agreement to complete the study period (Phase I), Whitehall turned its attention to the preparation of the next stage of the required documentation, viz. Agreement No.2, and the Anglo-French Treaty, which in turn demanded consultative and legislative processes. As Peyton had promised in his submission to the Cabinet EPC in July 1972 (see above, p. 95), an Interdepartmental Committee of senior officials was established to undertake a fundamental review of the project prior to the critical decision-making required in July 1973 and to ensure that ministers received the best possible advice. Chaired by Sir Idwal Pugh, Second Permanent Secretary of the DOE, it was staffed, inter alia, by Peter Lazarus from the Treasury and Peter Carey from the DTI, together with representatives from the FCO and CPRS. However, senior officials from the DOE dominated its membership: Harris, Wardale, Tom Beagley, Humphrey Cole, John Rosenfeld, Bill Sharp and Henry Woodhouse, in addition to officials from the CTSU, Melville, Kemp, and a newcomer, Susan Fogarty, who joined the Unit as an Assistant Secretary and took charge of its work. When the Committee first met on 12 October 1972, the Chairman noted that its task was ‘stiff’. First, it was to review the work undertaken by the Anglo-French Group and its project managers in producing the final assessments of the Tunnel’s economic, financial and engineering viability. Second, it was to determine the ‘total impact … on the economy and environment of the United Kingdom’, including ‘the commitment of physical resources, UK planning policies and the role of the project, with its associated road and rail investment’, the economic and social impact on South-east Kent, and the effect on the balance of payments. Last, and certainly not least, the Committee was also to be the forum for ensuring that, if endorsed, the project could go ahead smoothly. This required it to determine the content and timing of the parliamentary programme, embracing consultative documents, bills and debates. 1 While this package of duties was onerous, officials were particularly concerned about the parliamentary timetable, which was very tight. A short ‘money’ Bill was required in the 1972/3 session, to give the Secretary of State authority to incur the limited financial obligations in Phase II. This was to be followed in 1973/4 by a comprehensive ‘hybrid’ Bill granting the full powers necessary for completion. And since no substantive public information had been provided since the White Paper of 1963, it was also necessary to inform both parliament and the public of what was proposed, by means of ‘take-note’ debates in the Commons and Lords, and a White Paper setting out the results of the final studies and financial negotiations. The obligations in Agreement No.1 clearly put such requirements under considerable pressure. The Anglo-French Group was not required to produce its financial proposals until 7 June 1973, and the deadline for the final report on the studies was 1 July, but Agreement No.2 had to be signed by 31 July (though there was provision, with some financial risks, for a delay until 15 November). 2 An organisational change was made within the CTSU in early 1973 to handle these complexities. Fogarty, who became an Under-Secretary, took responsibility for the economic studies, railway investment, and the parliamentary papers. This left Melville and Kemp free to concentrate on negotiating the Agreement and Treaty. 3
