Abandonment, 1974–5

Edward Heath’s decision to fight an election in February 1974 on the issue ‘Who Governs Britain?’ was not, with hindsight, a success. The Conservatives’ manifesto, ‘Firm action for a fair Britain’, had a rather hollow ring, and Labour fought a subdued campaign, its main pledge being to renegotiate the terms of Britain’s membership of the European Community. The balance was probably tilted by Labour’s promise to be more adept at handling the unions and industrial unrest, Enoch Powell’s exhortation to vote Labour in order to get out of the European Community, and by the publication, three days before polling, of the largest ever recorded trade deficit (£383 million). There was a pervading air of disillusionment with the two main parties, and both lost ground. An extremely close contest produced the first inconclusive result since 1929. Labour secured 301 seats to the Conservatives’ 297; the Liberals polled 19 per cent of the vote, and with 14 seats held the ring. When Heath failed to obtain Liberal support, it was Harold Wilson who accepted the task of presiding over a minority government. ¹ In fact, winning the election was something of a poisoned chalice. As we have seen, the economic and political circumstances inherited from the Conservatives were very bleak indeed. Inflation and unemployment were soaring, public expenditure appeared to be out of control, there was a serious deficit in the balance of payments, and the industrial workforce was in a state of heightened tension following the three-day week and a coal strike. As the National Institute Economic Review observed, ‘it is not often that a government finds itself confronted with a possibility of a simultaneous failure to achieve all four main policy objectives – of adequate economic growth, full employment, a satisfactory balance of payments and reasonably stable prices’. ² There was therefore much to sort out, and it is unsurprising to find that the prevailing mood was one of profound caution rather than adventure, or that references to major projects such as the Tunnel, Maplin and Concorde, were limited. The Tunnel had not been mentioned in either of the main parties’ election manifestos, although the Conservatives had made dark hints about not making promises ‘beyond what the country can at present afford’. Hunt asserts that both the Labour and Liberal leaders made rude noises about the project in their electioneering. ³ However, the only published reference was in the Liberals’ document, a wholly negative statement that it was ‘not acceptable to press on with the £3,000 million projected expenditure on Concorde, Maplin and the Channel Tunnel simultaneously’, accompanied by the rider that the Tunnel ‘should be rail only, saving £240 million’. ⁴