ABSTRACT
In September 1981 there was a rather surprising development when the subject of the Fixed Channel Link was raised at a high level during an Anglo-French summit in London. The change of direction began with a considerable measure of disagreement within Whitehall. The Foreign Office had been anxious to include the Link on the bilateral relations agenda, but, having obtained Department of Transport support, had encountered strong opposition from the Treasury, which was keen to avoid this given the undeveloped state of the project. 1 There was also nervousness within the Cabinet Office. Following the Left’s landslide victory in the French National Assembly elections in June, the caretaker Transport Minister, Louis Mermaz, had been replaced by the leading communist, Charles Fiterman. Efforts were therefore made to remove transport matters from the formal agenda in an attempt to exclude him from the talks. 2 While British departments continued to argue, it became evident that Mitterand was more sympathetic to the idea of a fixed link than his predecessor, Giscard, had been, and when at last the membership of the French delegation was revealed, on 28 August, Fiterman’s name was included. 3 The agenda was hastily rewritten and Fowler’s name was added to the British team. However, the Treasury continued to complain, seeking adjustments to the ministerial briefing and insisting that the Link be excluded from the formal record. 4 On 10 September Fowler had ‘an extremely amicable’ first meeting with Fiterman. Both Ministers adopted a bullish tone about the project. Fowler ‘said that the British Government would be in favour of a fixed link if France also welcomed it’, though they ‘would want to be sure that the UK share could be financed privately’. Fiterman ‘said that in principle the French Government would be in favour of a study which would allow a Link to be established in the best conditions’, but they ‘would expect public financial control of their share of the project … and they favoured a rail link’. 5 Officials then prepared a low-key statement about plans for further studies. 6 But events took a more positive turn at the highest level. The Channel Link did not figure in the minutes of the Thatcher-Mitterand talks later in the day, where the discussions embraced issues such as telecommunications, computing and aircraft engines. But in the evening the Elysée’s Secretary-General, Pierre Bérégovoy, pressed Sir Robert Armstrong, the Cabinet Secretary, ‘for some demonstration of practical bilateral co-operation’ to emerge from the talks. As Armstrong noted, ‘he suggested that the President and the Prime Minister should “relaunch” the idea of the Tunnel. They should make a definite statement of intention’. 7 At a plenary session on the following day, 11 September, Fowler referred to his ‘useful discussion’ with Fiterman on the Channel Link, and the latter announced that the ‘French government approach was positive in principle’ and that he ‘welcomed the British desire for joint studies’. The ensuing press conference conveyed the fact that the talks had been conducted in a friendly and constructive atmosphere. On the Channel Link, Thatcher announced that the two sides proposed ‘to go ahead immediately with joint studies’ of the schemes being advanced. She announced that the British would wish it to be financed privately, while Mitterand observed that ‘each of the The illusive Tunnel dream: Varney, in <italic>Building</italic>, 20 November 1981. https://s3-euw1-ap-pe-df-pch-content-public-p.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/9780203969496/f21d4187-86af-4914-a9dd-bd736c5c6663/content/fig00012_B.jpg" xmlns:xlink="https://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"/>
