This chapter sets the context for the main body of the text. It, therefore, focuses on the generally low geographic importance of Greece from the naval perspective and the limited naval relations between Greece and the Great Powers prior to 1910. It discusses the Greek strategy of a protracted war on land and command of the sea and presents Greek adherence to the concept of the destruction of the enemy fleet in battle. Finally, it tackles the strengths, eccentricities and shortcomings of Greek naval development over the period.

The increasing corruption of the Ottoman administration, the degeneration of the imperial tax collection system and the Ottoman failure to adopt the techniques of the Commercial and Military Revolutions were in large measure responsible for the inability of the Ottoman Empire to maintain its territorial position from the end of the sixteenth century. The Turkish defeats during the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774 and the severe terms of the treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji underlined the seriousness of the situation.1