ABSTRACT
The two PUSC papers had left the Foreign Office with the major problem of trying to secure American financial support for its grand regional strategy in South-East Asia. Before submitting the papers to the cabinet, the department therefore decided to increase its lobbying efforts towards the United States. First, the British had to convince Washington that they would not involve the Americans in a potentially hazardous defence arrangement in South-East Asia. Yet, renewed speculation about a Pacific pact continued to fuel American suspicions of British intentions. On 15 May 1949, the Australian Prime Minister, Chifley, had stated that planning between Australia, New Zealand and Britain for the Pacific area was proceeding parallel with corresponding planning for the Atlantic area. The statement, which probably referred to the ANZAM treaty, drew fresh attention to Australia's earlier proposals for a Pacific pact. Both Washington and London immediately dampened Canberra's hopes for a Pacific defence treaty. On 1 8 May, Acheson publicly reiterated American opposition to a Pacific pact:
While it is true that there are serious dangers to world peace existing in the situation in Asia, it is also true, as Prime Minister Nehru of India stated to the press the other day, that a Pacific defence pact could not take shape until present internal conflicts in Asia were resolved . . . . Nehru 's view appears to be an objective appraisal of the actual, practical possibilities at the present time. 1
Anglo-American discouragement induced the Australian Defence Minister to tell the Australian House of Representatives that it was impossible to get other nations on the Pacific littoral
to ]Om in a Pacific pact. The best that could be done for the present was to integrate Australian defence plans with those of Britain and New Zealand.2 However, New Zealand's Prime Minister, Peter Fraser, was more persistent than his Australian counterpart. He told Attlee on 19 May of his increasing concern over the communist successes in creating or exploiting chaos and strife in the South-East Asian area. He further suggested that some form of Pacific pact was needed, and that Bevin might pay a
3visit to the Pacific to discuss the whole issue. Bevin expressed sympathy with Fraser's anxiety, but told the Foreign Office that likely American reactions made it necessary to proceed with caution. He particularly did not want to complicate matters before the Atlantic Pact had been ratified. 4 Fraser was therefore sent a polite refusal: Bevin was unable to leave Europe for the time being, and he was reluctant to take the initiative on a Pacific pact in view of Acheson's recent statement. However, Britain was anxious to press on with her j oint defence arrangement with
5Australia and New Zealand. In the following months, London continued to quell specula
tion about defence cooperation in the Pacific, advising its diplomatic representatives abroad to discourage any talk of a
6Pacific pact. When, in July, a British military planning mission was sent to Australia and New Zealand to discuss common defence planning, London refused to let the delegation discuss the question of a Pacific pact, as had been demanded by the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff. 7 The British wanted to avoid anything that would scare Washington or Delhi off their South-East Asian plans. Any Pacific or South-East Asian pact would have to follow regional cooperation in the economic and political sphere.
