ABSTRACT
In 1981, when he was a beginning philosopher of economics, Daniel Hausman’s award-winning PhD thesis was published by the Columbia University Press.1 With it he offered a very new approach to writing in the philosophy of economics. It attempted to break new ground in two directions, in philosophical analysis and in economic theory. This was a rather ambitious approach and at the same time a very risky one. Failure in either direction would jeopardize both objectives. As many philosophers of science have undoubtedly discovered already, an analysis which would satisfy philosophers is too often also one which would not impress the scientists in question.2 This is not to mention the additional obstacle presented by disagreements amongst the philosophers which may mean that even some of them will not be satisfied. If one’s objective is to impress philosophers then failure to satisfy the scientists may not be a serious drawback. I say ‘may not be’ because there is one case of unimpressed scientists which should be of concern to the philosopher-namely, the case where the scientists are dissatisfied because the philosopher has not accurately represented the scientists’ ideas or
theories. Most of the recent literature about the philosophy of physics or of chemistry probably would satisfy the average physicist or chemist. However, the recently growing literature on the philosophy of economics written by philosophers has not been sufficiently accurate to satisfy most economists-and for this reason most of this literature has not made a measurable impact on the economics profession.
