ABSTRACT

The name for the counterposition taken by G. Lakoff, J.McCawley, and J.Ross among others in the late 1960s in response to Chomsky’s conception of semantics in his 1965 ‘standard theory’ ( aspects model) of transformational grammar. Chomsky, Katz and Fodor (1963) argued that the syntactically motivated deep structure presents the only structure applicable to the semantic interpretive components of the grammar ( interpretive semantics). In contrast, the proponents of generative semantics maintained that semantic structures are generated in a form of basic (universal) rules similar to those of predicate logic. The meaning of individual lexemes is described as a syntactically structured complex of basic semantic elements ( lexical decomposition). For example, the verb convince (x convinces y to do z) is paraphrased by x does that y wants that z, where do and want are atomic predicates ( semantic primitives) which form more complex predicates through transformations. In addition, the number of syntactic categories is reduced to three: S (=proposition), NP (= argument), and V (=predicate). Since the logical-semantic form of the sentence is now seen as the underlying (generative) structure, the otherwise strict division between syntax and semantics collapses, especially between lexical semantics, word formation and the semantics of propositions. Critics of generative semantics pointed out the ad hoc nature of the descriptive mechanism and the ‘overpowerful’ generative power of this model (cf. global rule), whose apparatus could generate more complex structures than are realized in human languages. Interesting counterperspectives are found in Chomsky (1971) and Katz (1970) (interpretive semantics), Bartsch and Vennemann (1972) (categorial grammar), and Seuren (1985) (generative semantics).