ABSTRACT
The status of biological species continues to attract attention and controversy. (See, for instance, Eldredge and Cracraft 1980, Gould 1979a, Grant 1981, Levin 1979, Mayr 1982, Wiley 1978, 1980, Splitter 1982, Mishler and Donoghue 1982, Holsinger 1984, Kitcher 1984, Eldredge 1985b.) There is a strong feeling among biologists, at least there is a strong feeling among most zoologists and somewhat less of one among botanists (a difference to be discussed later), that species are somehow different from the other groupings of organisms we find (or make) in nature. Species, like Drosophila melanogaster or Canis lupus, are thought to be ‘natural’, in some way objective or existing independently of the classifier. In this, species differ from the groups (taxa) found at other ranks, for instance that of the genus. The classifier’s own thoughts and aims have a much greater role to play in the delimiting of members of these other groups.
