ABSTRACT
In the previous chapter, all our arguments coalesced around the idea of social surplus and its redistribution. If it is unappealing to either expropriate property (because it is unlawful and dishonest), or return to the worker his personal surplus value (because it is so difficult to determine), then we are left with the more abstract scenario of social surplus. Along these lines, the surplus that the worker under capitalism generates but that, for whatever reason, cannot be returned to the worker directly (through better wages and benefits), can be reallocated by an enlightened state. A state, through the revenue it generates from taxation (a form of social surplus), can allocate funds to alleviate poverty and social strife. It can make public goods more accessible to the poor, and it can provide the poor with the tools to enhance their human capital and thereby their value on a free and open labor market. So why does this not happen? Why do we have democratic states grounded in principles of “life, liberty, and justice for all,” that provide little if any means for the poor to better their lives? In the following chapter, we wish to address this dilemma in terms of the concept of corruption.
