ABSTRACT
The leitmotif of planning and social theory over the past two decades or so has been post: postmodern, post-structuralist and post-positivist. Whether one argues that planning theory has developed within this spirit (e.g. postmodernism) or in constructive opposition to it (e.g. communicative planning) its influence cannot be denied or ignored. Here, the term ‘post’, as in the debates over ‘post’-modern, does not necessarily follow the strict definition of ‘after’. ‘Post’ is just as likely to mean a development of that is significantly different from the original. In this respect, the ‘post’ of planning theory discussed above (under a wide definition) has been part of and has been heavily influenced by wider shifts in understanding and sensibilities in social theory and the philosophy of science. Planning theory is deeply embedded within social theory generally – communicative planning and critical theory are an example of how both normative and empirical/positive theories have been fused into planning thought. This shift in social theory has involved a questioning of the logic of positivism and the basis to scientific knowledge generally, which sought the discovery of a set of general methodological rules or forms of inference that would be the same in all sciences:
‘Post-empiricism’ signifies a loss of faith in this essentialist epistemology as the proper
guide in the philosophy of science, and calls into question the very idea of such a
‘logic’, as well as all those distinctions – hermeneutic or positivist – which rested upon
it.
