ABSTRACT
In theory, representational force accomplishes a great deal. It provides the cornerstone for a postconstructivist model of identity that is capable of doing what the conventional variant cannot-support the logic that international identities can exist during international crises and so can be a source of international order, sufficient for imposing order upon disorder. Among the various possible implications of this theoretic “uncovery” is that statesmen who are interested in ordering international politics to their advantage might do well to put identity-or more exactly, forceful narrative realities of particular desired identities-at the center of their practical agenda. But how well does the theoretic uncovery of representational force, as part of an identity and an orderproducing tool, gel with empirical practice? Can and do state-authors really use representational force to produce or re-produce preferred international identities? If so, do such forceful practices really have fastening effects on international orders?
